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Executive summary
The high point of global governance was reached in the mid-1990s around the creation 
of the World Trade Organisation. It was hoped that globalisation would be buttressed by a 
system of global rules and a network of specialised global institutions. Two decades later 
these hopes have been dashed by a series of global governance setbacks, the rise of economic 
nationalism and the dramatic change of attitude of the United States administration. From 
trade to the environment, a retreat from multilateralism is observable. The 2008 elevation of 
the G20 to leaders’ level was an exception to this trend. But the G20 is no more than a political 
steering body.
The reasons for this retreat partially arise from political developments in individual 
countries. But such factors hide series specific roadblocks to global governance: the growing 
number and diversity of countries involved; the mounting rivalry between the US and China; 
doubts about globalisation and the distribution of the associated benefits; the obsolescence 
of global rules and institutions; imbalances within the global governance regime; and in-
creased complexity.
What, then, should be the way forward? The demand for global governance has not 
diminished, but support for binding multilateral arrangements has. There is a need for alter-
native governance technologies that better accommodate the diversity of players, provide for 
more flexibility and rely less on compulsion. From competition to financial regulation, such 
arrangements have been developed in a series of fields already. They are often hailed as pro-
viding a solution to the governance conundrum. But their effectiveness should be assessed 
critically. Can they overcome the free-rider curse and enforcement problems? Usual game 
theory suggests not. Not all games are similar, however, and some collective action problems 
can be tackled without recourse to coercion.
Against this background, multilateralists hesitate over the choice of a strategy. One 
option would be to seek to preserve the existing order to the greatest extent possible. Its 
downside is that it does not address the underlying problems. An alternative option is to try 
to redesign international arrangements, putting the emphasis on flexibility and voluntary 
participation. Its downside is that it risks overlooking the intrinsic problems of international 
or global collective action. A potentially more promising approach would be to define the 
minimum conditions that the multilateral framework must fulfil to provide a strong-enough 
basis for flexible, variable-geometry and possibly informal arrangements. 
In the end, we should neither cultivate the nostalgia of yesterday’s order nor invest our 
hopes in ineffective international cooperation. The narrow path ahead is to establish a suf-
ficient, critical multilateral base for flexible arrangements and to equip policymakers with 
a precise toolkit for determining, on a field-by-field basis, the minimum requirements for 
effective collective action. 
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Introduction
Flash back to 1995. After an eight-decades-long split, the world economy was in the process of 
being reunified. To manage an ever-growing degree of interdependence, the global com-
munity had initiated a process aimed at strengthening the existing international institutions 
and creating new ones. The World Trade Organisation (WTO) had just been brought to life, 
equipped with a binding dispute-resolution mechanism that would, among other things, pro-
vide an effective channel for managing China’s transition from a closed, planned economy to 
an open economy that plays by the rules of global markets. A new round of multilateral trade 
negotiations was in preparation. The Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI) was being 
negotiated under the aegis of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development 
(OECD).  The creation of a global competition system was contemplated. The International 
Monetary Fund (IMF) would soon be given a broader mandate to oversee cross-border cap-
ital flows. A legally binding international agreement, the Kyoto Protocol on climate change, 
was being negotiated, and plans were drawn for an international environment organisation 
that would provide a fifth pillar to the global order, alongside the WTO, the Bretton Woods in-
stitutions, and the (less effective) International Labour Organisation (ILO). There were strong 
hopes that the institutional architecture of globalisation was being built. 
The intended message to the people was clear: globalisation—a new concept at the 
time—was not just about liberalising flows of goods, services and capital. It was also about 
establishing the rules and public institutions required to steer markets, foster cooperative 
behaviour on the part of governments, and manage a single global economy. Global public 
goods—another new concept that was loosely applied to a series of issues from biodiversity to 
climate and from public health to financial stability—would be taken care of through jointly 
agreed rules of the game. The successful Montreal Protocol on eliminating ozone-depleting 
gases, agreed in 1987, provided an encouraging template. 
These claims were not exempt from hype. Liberalisation was real, but the strengthening of 
the legal and institutional architecture was only in the making. Also, there were problems with 
the governance of global institutions:
• To start with, Europe, the United States and Japan were not only running the show by 
participating in the Group of Seven (G7); they were also overrepresented on the boards 
of the IMF and the World Bank, and they enjoyed disproportionate influence in the other 
major institutions. There was a clear need to redistribute power and influence in favour of 
emerging and developing countries, whose weight in the world population and GDP was 
growing fast;
• Second, governance through sectoral institutions was potentially problematic: each one 
dealt with one particular field, but none was in charge of cross-sectoral issues such as 
trade and exchange rates, trade and labour, or trade and the environment (to name just 
a few). True, the United Nations was meant to provide an overall framework. But in the 
economic field at least, the UN system was deprived of effectiveness ; 
• Third, these institutions were increasingly criticised for being undemocratic because they 
were accountable only to governments and not to any parliamentary body. Civil society 
organisations and environmental NGOs were insistently calling for a remedy to these defi-
ciencies. The international institutions were slowly learning to give them a voice. 
The way forward looked clear: liberalisation would be pursued further and globalisation 
would be managed by strengthening and developing a network of global institutions, each of 
which would take responsibility for one of the main channels of interdependence. The gov-
ernance of these institutions would be reformed, so that emerging and developing countries 
would gradually gain power at the expense of the advanced countries. These institutions 
would cooperate to address cross-sectoral issues and, as a substitute for proper accountability 
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to a non-existing global parliament, they would develop a dialogue with civil society. Some, 
like Rodrik (1997), doubted this could be a workable solution and highlighted a trilemma 
between deep integration, national autonomy and democratic governance. But there was 
hardly another template on offer.        
Fast forward now to 2018. Despite more than a decade of discussions, the global trade 
negotiations launched in 2001 in Doha (known as the Doha round) have not led anywhere. 
The WTO is still there but on the verge of becoming wholly ineffective. After obstructing the 
WTO’s dispute settlement system by preventing the appointment of new members to its 
Appellate Body, President Trump declared on 30 August 2018 that the US would pull out of 
the WTO unless the organisation “shapes up”1. Negotiations over the MAI collapsed in 1998. 
The Kyoto Protocol was signed, but was not lastingly implemented, largely because the US 
decided not to ratify it. The 2009 Copenhagen conference on climate change failed to reach 
agreement on mandatory limits on greenhouse gas emissions and ended in dispute. Less than 
two years after a general, though non-quantitative and non-binding agreement was reached 
on the occasion of the 2015 COP21 in Paris, the US announced in June 2017 its withdrawal 
from it. And nobody talks of a global competition system or a global environmental organisa-
tion anymore. 
Economic nationalism is on the rise. Its offensive guise, state capitalism, is a much more 
powerful force than anybody expected a quarter of a century ago. It is especially, but far from 
exclusively, strong in China where corporate champions that were expected to transform into 
standard public companies remain under the direct or indirect control of the government. 
Nearly a decade after China joined the WTO, the balance between state-led coordination and 
market-led coordination is not at all what it was supposed to be. Contrary to expectations, 
there is growing fear that the Chinese model of development is diverging from the standard 
market economy template (Wu, 2016).  Policy instruments that China regards as development 
levers are seen by the US administration as instruments of economic control that distort com-
petition and hurt US interests2. 
Economic nationalism’s defensive guise, protectionism, is especially, but far from exclu-
sively strong in the US where the Trump administration has embarked on a series of ruthless 
(and fairly incoherent) initiatives against its main trade partners. In trade at least, it has taken 
the bilateral route and disregards multilateral rules and procedures entirely. Particularly 
worrying is the fact that the US has used a national security clause in the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) to impose tariffs on imports from its allies and partners. Coun-
tries regarded as running excessive bilateral surpluses are being commanded to reduce them 
without delay. China has been brutally ordered to import more, export less, cut subsidies, 
refrain from purchasing US technology companies, curtail investment in sensitive sectors 
and respect intellectual property (US Government, 2018). The very principles of multilateral-
ism, that pillar of global governance, seem to have become a relic from a distant past. The US 
seems to have reverted to its interwar defiance vis-à-vis the international system. 
The retreat of multilateralism is not limited to the trade realm. It is also visible—though 
much less pronounced—in international finance where three broad trends are noticeable (De 
Gregorio et al, 2018). First, the IMF’s attempt to gain a formal extension of its mandate failed 
already in 1997 and there has been a move away from across-the-board financial account 
liberalisation. According to the index built by Fernández et al (2016), average restrictions 
on financial flows bottomed out in the mid-2000s. Since then, capital controls and other 
regulatory impediments to free movement of capital have regularly increased. Second, since 
1   Interview with Bloomberg, 30 August 2018. 
2   According to the US Trade Representative (2018: 17), “a key part of China’s technology drive involves the acquisition of 
foreign technologies through acts, policies, and practices by the Chinese government that are unreasonable or discrimi-
natory and burden or restrict U.S. commerce. These acts, policies, and practices work collectively as part of a multi-fac-
eted strategy to advance China’s industrial policy objectives. They are applied across a broad range of sectors, overlap in 
their use of policy tools (eg the issuance of planning documents and guidance catalogues), and are implemented through 
a diverse set of state and state-backed actors, including state-owned enterprises.” 
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the Asian crisis of 1998, there has been an increasing reliance on unilateral, bilateral or 
regional solutions rather than on the multilateral safety nets provided by the IMF. National 
reserves have increased more than tenfold since 2000, against a factor of 3.7 for IMF resources 
(Truman, 2018). In 2007-08, US dollar swap lines were extended on a strictly bilateral basis by 
the Federal Reserve to selected central banks; they proved instrumental in avoiding finan-
cial disruption but the initial choice of partner central banks and the later decision to grant 
to some of them permanent access to dollar liquidity have been purely discretionary. Third, 
regional financing arrangements have developed as a complement but also a potential substi-
tute to the multilateral safety net. Whereas Europe is admittedly a special case because of the 
introduction of a common currency, the instruments in place could conceivably be used in 
a broader regional context. Reliance on regional cooperation has also developed in Asia and 
Latin America.  
The trend is similar in relation to the environment. Although the Paris Agreement of 
December 2015 was hailed as a success of international cooperation, it is far less constrain-
ing than the Montreal and Kyoto protocols. Signatories did not commit to internationally 
determined emission ceilings nor did they subscribe to a multilateral system of rules; rather, 
each state individually announced what it intended to contribute to the common endeavour, 
frequently conditional on efforts made by others or on the availability of financial support 
(Tagliapietra, 2018). There is no enforcement mechanism either. Beyond climate, the failure to 
address the rapid deterioration of biodiversity illustrates the limits of commitments to collec-
tive action to protect the environment.  
Cross-sectoral initiatives also cast doubts over the global governance model of the late 
twentieth century. A puzzling case is the Chinese Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). At one level it 
can be analysed as a regional infrastructure development endeavour. But it is also presented 
by Chinese sponsors as a potentially more encompassing project and a “new globalisation 
mechanism” (Jin, 2018). US critics regard it instead as “debt diplomacy to expand influence” 
(Pence, 2018). An early test will be provided by the treatment of the bilateral debt overhangs 
of partner countries. So far, China has been reluctant to contemplate settling overindebted-
ness cases within the framework of the Paris Club, the usual multilateral venue.
It is hard not to conclude that recent developments in a wide range of fields have dashed 
the expectations of the 1990s. These developments challenge the system of universal, multi-
lateral, public, treaty-based, institution-supported and legally enforceable rules that provided 
the basis for global governance since the second world war. The legal and institutional order 
that underpinned international economic relations for seven decades is undergoing a slow, 
but major overhaul. 
The exception to this trend – admittedly quite a significant one, at first sight at least – has 
been the creation of the Group of Twenty (G20). At the end of 2008, in response to the Global 
Financial Crisis, the dramatic decision to establish it (or, more precisely, to elevate an existing 
finance ministers’ body to government leaders’ level) suddenly gave emerging countries the 
voice at the high table they had for many years been asking for. Furthermore, it involved them 
in the design of a financial and macroeconomic response to the worst crisis in six decades. In 
Washington in November 2008, the G20 initiated a comprehensive financial reform agenda, 
the implementation of which would be monitored by a new institution, the Financial Stability 
Board (FSB)3. In London in April 2009, the G20 engineered a concerted budgetary stimulus of 
an unprecedented magnitude – in which, for the first time ever, the emerging and developing 
countries participated alongside the advanced countries. In London also, it was decided to 
increase significantly the resources of the IMF and to proceed with a special one-time alloca-
tion of Special Drawing Rights (SDRs), in order to beef up liquidity at the global level. And in 
Pittsburgh in September 2009, the G20 initiated a Mutual Assessment Process through which 
3   The FSB, an assembly of regulatory and financial authorities from G20 and several other countries, was not created 
ex nihilo but succeeded the previously existing Financial Stability Forum, whose mandate was significantly en-
hanced.  
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the contribution of national policies to the reduction of global imbalances would be regularly 
monitored by the IMF and discussed among national policymakers4. Since then, the G20 
has continued to serve as platform for political dialogue and as a steering body for collective 
initiatives in a variety of fields (Bery, 2018).
The creation of the G20 was initially hailed as a major step forward for global governance. 
The leaders claimed that “a global crisis requires global solutions” (London Declaration, April 
2009), and announced that the G20 would become “the premier forum for international 
economic cooperation” (Pittsburgh declaration, September 2009). The G20’s establishment 
and first steps marked indeed a major departure from the ‘Own House in Order’ doctrine that 
dominated international economic relations in the early 2000s. Because the Global Financial 
Crisis illustrated that financial stability is a global public good, the provision of which cannot 
be left to national authorities acting in isolation, it resulted in a major revision of the prevail-
ing international policy doctrine.
But there should be no mistake. The G20 is no international organisation. It is a political 
institution that works by consensus and steers the work of technical bodies by issuing politi-
cal guidelines. The technical bodies themselves are not organisations equipped with effective 
powers, but are mere coordinating forums. To produce results, the G20 therefore relies on 
its agenda-setting power and a chain of institutions of uneven effectiveness. Its creation was 
not meant to imply that participating countries intended to strengthen international law and 
abide by it. And actually they did not: in the financial field, arguably the domain where most 
efforts were concentrated in the aftermath of the global crisis, the FSB was neither created as 
a universal institution nor equipped with decision-making or enforcement powers. Its mem-
bership comprises 68 institutions, including ministries of finance, central banks and supervi-
sory and regulatory authorities from 25 jurisdictions, as along with 10 international organisa-
tions and standard-setting bodies. It is structured as a coordinating platform that promotes, 
monitors and advises – in other words “orchestrates” the action of independent national and 
supranational bodies (Abbott et al, 2015). So even in the most active of all fields, a significant 
departure from the standard model is noticeable. 
The G20 furthermore quickly disappointed hopes (or fears) that it would effectively 
coordinate national economic policies. The Global Financial Crisis was more a high-noon 
moment than the start of a continuous coordination process. Writing only a few years after 
the first G20 summit, Angeloni and Pisani-Ferry (2012) already concluded that they were 
fearful of “diminishing returns”. Developments since have not resulted in a revision of this 
judgement. 
1 Roadblocks to global governance
While the increasingly adversarial tone of the international discussion owes considerably to 
the specific stance of the Trump administration, most observers agree that problems began 
before the 2016 US presidential election. Almost ten years ago, Richard Haass (2010) asserted 
that multilateralism in the twenty-first century was likely to be more fluid and more messy 
than it used to be. And five years ago, Hale et al (2013) claimed that the international com-
munity was facing a gridlock of global governance; they observed that stalemate had been 
reached on a number of fronts and that gaps in the system of international relations were not 
being filled. 
What is the reason for this change in the landscape? It would be hard to claim that it is due 
to diminishing demand for collective action. If anything, the need has increased with integra-
tion on a global scale and concerns over global public goods such as climate change mitiga-
4   Angeloni and Pisani-Ferry (2012) provide a critical account of the G20’s early initiatives.  
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tion, the fight against terrorism, economic and financial stability, or protection against cyber-
attacks. Citizens worldwide are increasingly conscious of the need for common responses to 
these global threats to prosperity and security (Pew Research, 2017). 
Politics provides a tempting explanation why supply does not meet demand. Already in 
the 1990s, strong reservations about supranational institutions were regularly expressed by 
sovereignty- conscious governments and parliaments, starting with the US Congress. Since 
then politics has moved further in the direction of curtailing the powers of supranational 
institutions. From the US to Europe and from India to China, nationalism and identity politics 
are on the rise everywhere. Among “somewhere people”, to use Goodhart’s (2017) cogent 
expression, anger against “anywhere people” and especially rootless international bureaucrats 
has risen dramatically, fuelled by shrewd political entrepreneurs. International civil servants 
were not loved, but at least they were deemed competent. The global financial crisis has 
dented this reputation.   
From this observation, one might conclude that global rules and institutions are simply 
caught in a political storm whose roots are much deeper and much more perplexing than 
anything directly related to the operation and performance of these very rules and institu-
tions. But if politics is changing, broad explanations should not serve as an excuse to not iden-
tify more proximate causes. Five major roadblocks hamper the provision of global govern-
ance. 
A. Geopolitics
The first reason why global governance is in trouble is of a geopolitical nature: the rules and 
institutions established in the mid-twentieth century have been questioned by the accelerat-
ed change in the balance of economic and political power between the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’. 
Specifically, and importantly, US global leadership is increasingly challenged. 
Scholars of international relations regard the international liberal order put in place at US 
initiative after the second world war as a political project as much as an economic one. The 
global governance regime was conceived in such a way that it would serve as an antidote to 
war between participating nations and as a glue that would strengthen the Atlantic alliance. 
The liberal international order, to use the characterisation of Ikenberry (2015, 2018) was both 
multilateral (in that all participants were subject to the same rules) and hegemonic (in that it 
had been built by and around the US, which as the major power served both as an anchor and 
as provider of public goods). The core quid pro quo was that the hegemon would both benefit 
from its central position and accept being significantly (though not entirely) constrained by 
the multilateral rules, for example international trade rules. In the words of Ikenberry (2018), 
the US was supposed to behave as the ‘first citizen’ of that world.
Over the last quarter of century, three transformations have been at play:
• The first has to do with the number of significant participants in the global game. Back 
in 1990, there were actually few: only the US, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, Australia, 
South Korea, Taiwan and the oil producers really mattered. One of Olson’s rules of thumb 
for collective action is that size matters and, as it increases, renders cooperation more 
difficult, an evolution well illustrated by the transition from the G7 to the G20 (Olson 1965; 
see also Laïdi, 2018);
• The second, related transformation arises from the increased diversity of participants: 
because international unions result from a trade-off between economies of scale and the 
heterogeneity of preferences, an increase in the latter is bound to hamper cooperation 
(Alesina et al, 2005). As developing and emerging countries have grown disproportion-
ately, yesterday’s small and relatively homogeneous club has become much more diverse 
(again, this is illustrated by the G20); 
• The third transformation has to do with leadership. Whereas the US briefly emerged in the 
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1990s as the world’s ‘hyperpower’ (to use an expression coined by former French minister 
Hubert Védrine), its relative military, economic and political weight has diminished over 
the last quarter of century, while that of Europe has slid at an even faster pace. Because 
of its scientific, financial and strategic might, the US is still by far the dominant power, 
but in terms of sheer economic weight, influence and – increasingly – control of critical 
resources and technologies, China has emerged as a fast-rising rival (Bergsten, 2018). In 
an unusually harsh speech in October 2018, US Vice-President Pence emphasised that the 
administration was unwilling to tolerate what he described as hostile Chinese behaviour 
(Pence, 2018).     
The key geopolitical question for the future is whether an international order can help 
manage a gradual shift in the power balance between the US and China. That there is a 
demand for it is clear. According to Allison (2017), important “clues” from the analysis of 
past episodes of rivalry are that “higher authorities can help resolve rivalry without war” 
and that “states can be embedded in larger economic, political, and security institutions that 
constrain historically ‘normal’ behaviours” . An international order may therefore help avoid 
Thucydides’ trap – that when one great power faces displacement by another, war is almost 
always the result. The question, however, is whether such an international order can be 
sustained. The incumbent leader might regard it as an excessive limitation on the use of its 
power – something the Trump administration has ceaselessly emphasised – while the rising 
power might regard rules as excessively determined by the preferences of the incumbent – an 
opposite concern regularly expressed by China5. In such a case the international order can be 
a casualty of the confrontation between the incumbent and the rising nations. 
China’s rise is not the only geopolitical challenge to the US-led international order. Height-
ened tension with Russia, growing terrorism-related security concerns and increasingly 
assertive emerging countries have all contributed to changing the global picture. But China’s 
rise is probably the most significant challenge for the medium term.   
B. Second thoughts on globalisation
The second obstacle results from a change in attitudes towards globalisation. Since the 1990s 
the intellectual and political consensus in favour of economic openness, international inte-
gration and the strengthening of international rules and institutions has weakened signifi-
cantly. It is fair to say that many countries are having second thoughts on globalisation.    
Globalisation and its governance are not exactly the same thing. Dissatisfaction with 
the consequences of the former – because of increased inequality and social dislocation in 
the advanced countries, and because of the overhaul of traditional markets in the emerging 
countries – are not necessarily attributable to failures of the latter. Rather, they can be, and 
frequently are, the consequences of the opening of those sectors previously sheltered from 
trade and investment flows and of the lack of appropriate domestic policy responses. For an 
advanced country, opening to trade with less-advanced partners is bound to create losers. To 
compensate or retrain the losers, or to reform labour, product and capital markets so that they 
can find opportunities in other sectors, is the task of domestic policies, not of international 
institutions. For example, the US federal  government and national labour market institutions 
are mostly to blame for the dismal reallocation and redistribution record documented by 
Autor et al (2013), but unfair foreign competition and the global rules that permitted it are 
easy to blame. Similarly, the reallocation of factors of production to new sectors is a domestic 
responsibility in emerging and developing economies. An important reason why global gov-
ernance is in trouble therefore arises from a backlash against national failures to correct the 
distributional effects of globalisation within countries.  
A more challenging issue analytically is whether the aggregate gains from globalisation 
have been unevenly distributed among participating countries. The Trump administration’s 
5  For recent perspectives on China’s view of the world, see Rudd (2018) and Wolf  (2018). 
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basic claim is that the US has been losing out whereas China has gained overwhelmingly from 
trade liberalisation. Although this an undoubtedly biased assessment, it is indisputable that 
technology transfers to emerging countries can cost the advanced countries an accelerated 
erosion of their innovation rent and can result in a net loss for them – a point made by Sam-
uelson (2004) more than ten years ago6. By the same token, one of the reasons for the failure 
of the Doha round has been the perception that developing countries had lost out in the Uru-
guay round because the resulting agreement committed them to open their services markets 
but did not give them enough access to the agricultural markets of the advanced countries. 
Since the mid-1990s, export gains have been very unevenly distributed among developing 
countries and only a handful of them has experienced industrialisation and a rise in man-
ufacturing exports (Baldwin, 2016). Several other developing and emerging countries have 
experienced “premature deindustrialisation” (Rodrik, 2015). In such conditions, sustaining an 
open, non-discriminatory trade regime is politically challenging to say the least.
In the financial field, there has been a major revision of the 1990s consensus on the ben-
efits of opening to capital movements. Whereas the US and a few other advanced countries 
have been net beneficiaries of the global demand for safe assets (Caballero et al, 2008), many 
emerging countries have suffered from destabilising capital inflows followed by sudden stops 
with, as a result, financial crises, IMF programmes, and, ultimately, changes to their financial 
account regimes.
C. Obsolescence of global rules and institutions
Although the previous argument primarily rests on the broad pattern of international trade 
and finance, the adverse effects of external liberalisation can be compounded by inadequate 
governance. As far as trade is concerned, two cases in point are, first, inertia in the categorisa-
tion of countries, especially the fact that emerging countries, including China, still enjoy de-
veloping country status in the WTO; and, second, failures to enforce the adequate protection 
of intellectual property (an issue on which the EU recently joined the US and filed a complaint 
at the WTO against Chinese practices; see European Union, 2018). These grievances, and oth-
ers concerning subsidies or investment, are not new: they were clearly spelled out by policy-
makers from the Obama administration (see for example, Schwab, 2011, and Wu, 2016). The 
underlying concern is that the systemic convergence on a market economy template that was 
expected from participation in the WTO has failed to materialise. The rules and institutions 
of global trade have brought shallow convergence but not the deeper alignment of economic 
systems that was hoped for.  
More generally, existing rules and institutions were conceived for a different world. This is 
very apparent in the trade field: the GATT/WTO framework dates from what Baldwin (2016) 
has called the “first unbundling” of production and consumption. They were not designed 
for the “second unbundling” of knowledge and production that gave rise to the emergence 
of global value chains. For decades, the implicit assumption behind the structure of trade 
negotiations has been that nations have well-defined sectoral trade interests: they are 
either exporters or importers. But in a world of global value chains, they are both importers 
and exporters of similar products simultaneously. Even if the principles of multilateralism 
remain valid, important features of the rules and institutions in which they are embedded are 
increasingly outdated.   
In the same way, opening to capital movements was supposed to result in net financial 
flows from savings-rich to savings-poor countries. What has happened instead is a massive 
increase in gross flows resulting in the interpenetration of financial systems and the coexist-
ence of sizeable external assets and liabilities. The consequence has been the emergence of 
a global financial cycle (see for example Rey, 2017) and of policy dilemmas that are quite dif-
6   The point is best understood in the context of a two-country Dornbusch-Fischer-Samuelson (1977) model of Ricard-
ian trade with a continuum of goods: technological catching-up by the less advanced country erodes the compara-
tive advantage of the advanced country and may reduce its gain from trade.  
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ferent from those arising in a simple Mundell-Fleming framework, in which interdependence 
takes place through net inflows and outflows of capital.
Developments in the climate field further illustrate the point. The 1997 Kyoto Protocol was 
negotiated under the assumption that the bulk of greenhouse gas emissions would continue 
to originate in the advanced countries. But by the time the Protocol was meant to enter into 
force, it was clear already that the hypothesis was deeply wrong. The exemption of develop-
ing countries from emissions reductions was one of the reasons why the US did not ratify 
the treaty. The failed Copenhagen agreement of 2009 was an attempt to replicate Kyoto on a 
global scale, but there was no consensus for such an approach.   
Rules can be reformed and institutions can adapt. But this is a long and demanding 
process, especially when it requires unanimity, when participating countries have diverging 
interests and when changes require ratification by parliaments where there is no majority to 
support them. Global rules therefore exhibit a strong inertia that often prevents necessary 
adaptations. Trade rules, amendments to which require unanimity, are a case in point. 
Institutions are nimbler and can adapt to changing priorities or perspectives on interde-
pendence. The IMF for example has succeeded in adjusting to major changes in the interna-
tional economic regime and major shifts in the intellectual consensus. But even institutions 
face limitations to their ability to keep up with underlying transformations. This is one of the 
reasons why solutions to emerging problems have often been looked for outside the existing 
multilateral, institution-based governance framework (Table 1).
Table 1: Global governance responses to changing global challenges
Field Changes over last 
25 years
Attempted multilateral 
responses
Alternative responses
Trade and 
investment
Mobility of 
technology, rise of 
global value chains
Failed Doha round
Failed MAI attempt
Bilateral / regional 
treaties
Club arrangements
Finance Increased intensity 
of sudden stops
Emergence of 
global financial 
cycle
Failed attempt to 
broaden IMF mandate
Monitoring of financial 
stability, coordinated 
regulatory initiatives
Financial protectionism, 
self-insurance, 
regionalism
Competition Concentration on 
global scale
None Extraterritorial reach 
of national competition 
authorities
Climate 
change
Emergence as major 
global concern
Failed Kyoto Protocol 
among advanced 
countries
Failed Copenhagen 
conference
Agreement on voluntary 
contributions (Paris 
agreement)
Data Exponential 
increase of flows, 
emergence of global 
platforms
Mere consultations Prevalence of industry 
standards
]Emergence of national 
regulations
Risk of increasing 
fragmentation
Source: Bruegel.
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D. The imbalances of global governance
A further reason for popular dissatisfaction with global governance is its unbalanced nature. 
The deeper international integration becomes, the broader the scope of policy its manage-
ment should cover, and the more acute the tension between the technical requirements of 
global interdependence and the domestically-rooted legitimacy of public policies. This is 
most apparent in the field of taxation. International tax optimisation by multinationals has 
become an issue of significant relevance and it is estimated that 40 percent of their profit is 
being artificially shifted to low-tax countries – with major consequences for national budgets 
(Tørsløv et al, 2018). But the fact that taxation remains at the core of sovereign prerogatives 
limits the scope and ambition of initiatives conducted at international level. The result, which 
can be regarded as an illustration of Rodrik’s trilemma, is that global coordination in tax 
matters falls short of what equity-conscious citizens regard as desirable and, at the same time, 
exceeds what sovereignty-conscious citizens consider acceptable. 
The imbalances of global governance are by no means limited to the taxation field. The same 
can be found in a series of domains, for example biodiversity and the preservation of nature. 
E. Increased complexity
The final obstacle to multilateral solutions has to do with the sheer complexity of the chal-
lenges global governance has to tackle. In recent decades channels of international inter-
dependence have both multiplied and diversified. They now link together countries with 
significantly differing levels of technical, economic or financial development. Because they 
have developed outside the scope of negotiated rules and established institutions, some of 
channels of interdependence also escape the reach of international agreements to an un-
precedented degree. This is especially, but not only, the case of the internet and the multiple 
networks that rely on it. The world does not fit anymore the usual representation whereby 
individual nations trade goods, capital and technology. Even putting aside geopolitical con-
sequences and assuming a shared commitment to openness and multilateral solutions, such 
complexity is bound to test the limits of existing international governance arrangements. 
2 Global governance beyond the standard 
model
The pervasive gridlock affecting the traditional global governance approach does not imply 
that existing rules are condemned to oblivion – although this could happen – or that existing 
institutions are bound to lose effectiveness – although some certainly will. Even in a very 
pessimistic scenario, the demise of the international order is likely to be slow and uneven. 
But at the very least, the gridlock calls into question the idea of broadening the scope of the 
traditional model beyond its core remit, and it calls for alternatives, either as substitutes for 
obsolete arrangements or to address emerging collective action problems in new, inade-
quately covered fields. 
With little political capital to invest in the creation or the reform of universal multilateral 
arrangements, the problem in a nutshell is to determine if and when to rely on alternative 
governance arrangements. To offer a proper substitute,  such arrangements would need to 
accommodate increased diversity amongst players, while avoiding requiring the same levels 
of commitment from participating countries. Or they could combine governmental and 
non-governmental dimensions. But they should nevertheless deliver results. Responding to 
this problem requires both precise analysis of the obstacles that prevent collective action in 
each field, and insights derived from concrete experience. 
We are already witnessing an evolution towards softer, more voluntary and flexible forms 
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of cooperation. Emerging governance formats are frequently not universal, but regional or 
partial; not treaty-based, but reliant on ad-hoc voluntary cooperation; not institution-sup-
ported, even though existing institutions can provide technical advice; not or only partially 
legally enforceable; less Westphalian than traditional cooperation used to be, as subnational 
and private players take part in them; and even sometimes not public. The keywords are vol-
untary commitment, flexibility and variable geometry. To name just a few fields: 
• Deep trade and integration agreements increasingly involve ‘coalitions of the willing’, 
either on a regional basis or according to their specialisation; 
• Investment agreements are exclusively bilateral;
• The coexistence of national competition authorities whose reach extends beyond borders, 
for example in the case of merger controls, is managed through agreement on shared 
principles, bilateral consultations and a loose coordination network;  
• Whereas the IMF was initially conceived as a single financial safety net for the world, and 
functioned as such for several decades, regional financial safety nets have been created 
in Europe, Asia and Latin America. The euro area is on the verge of equipping itself with a 
fully-fledged ‘European Monetary Fund’; 
• Almost all countries have taken part in the Paris agreement on climate change, but on the 
basis of freely-chosen commitments rather than common legally binding obligations; 
• Banking regulation initiatives launched in the aftermath of the Great Financial Crisis are 
rooted in the 28-member Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. Implementation of 
the corresponding standards is being monitored, but is not mandatory;  
• Tax cooperation agreements concluded within the framework of the Base Erosion and 
Profit Shifting (BEPS) initiative launched by the OECD involve subsets of countries and tax 
jurisdictions (such as the Isle of Man or the British Virgin Islands). Membership of BEPS is 
not universal (a number of Latin American, African and Asian countries do not take part) 
and not all members participate in all cooperation agreements.  
Some of these arrangements are treaty-based, such as the regional trade agreements. 
Some are informal, such as the Paris Agreement on climate change mitigation. Some involve 
binding commitments; some are based on mere pledge-and-review mechanisms. Some 
involve states only; some involve, formally or informally, infranational players such as subna-
tional governments and cities. Outcomes are often determined by the balance and interplay 
between national interests, but also by the cross-country interaction between players of 
different nature: scientific communities, NGOs, private corporations and subnational govern-
ments all play their parts alongside sovereign states.  
The analytical and policy question is, can such flexible cooperation succeed? Can coali-
tions or groups effectively address problems of a global character? Can analytical consensus 
be reached and sustained between a series of independent players? How are externalities 
dealt with? Can informal arrangements overcome the free-rider curse which is pervasive in 
international cooperation? Can enforcement be ensured? Hard questions of this type should 
not be avoided, because experience shows that goodwill is not sufficient to overcome the 
many problems involved in international cooperation. 
To this series of questions, the usual game-theory-based approach suggests a sceptical 
response. Externalities cannot be tackled by goodwill only, and it is not by accident that the 
post-second world war regime was based on universal rules, nearly universal membership in 
international institutions and often precise enforcement mechanisms. By contrast, it is strik-
ing how frequently contemporary international cooperation arrangements seem to rely on an 
excessively casual treatment of externalities.    
A priority for research and public policy is therefore to find out through what mechanisms 
these arrangements are expected to operate (how they work in theory), to analyse concretely 
whether they deliver results (how they work in practice), and to determine whether and 
under what conditions they can form the basis of an emerging global governance model. In 
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particular, the challenges they face should be investigated, and whether they address these 
challenges in a coherent way.
Ideas put forward by practitioners or international relation scholars are often sugges-
tive, but fail to convince that such issues are dealt with systematically enough. To take only 
two examples, the “sovereign obligation” concept put forward by Haass (2017) to highlight 
the duties of sovereign states to their neighbours and partners in an interconnected world 
and the “creative coalition” concept proposed by the Oxford Martin Commission for Future 
Generations led by Pascal Lamy (Oxford Martin Commission, 2013), belong to two oppo-
site traditions but share the absence of a systematic treatment of participation incentives 
and enforcement challenges. The same issue arises in the Westphalian world of Haass and 
the post-Westphalian world of Lamy: how do participants overcome the collective-action 
problem? Though both approaches suggest ways to overcome the global governance gridlock, 
neither offers a compelling solution to the participation and enforcement challenges involved 
in any joint endeavour.    
To address these issues, the game-theoretical approach of international interdepend-
ence and collective action (see eg Sandler, 2004) provides a useful starting point. A key result 
from it is that interaction models and corresponding game structures vary from issue to 
issue, which implies that incentives to cooperate can differ substantially depending on the 
field. Obstacles to successful cooperation are pervasive, but not systematically as decisive as 
suggested by oversimplified models. Reliance on a prisoners’ dilemma structure to represent 
the nature of the underlying game can be misleading, if the underlying game resulting from 
the nature of interactions between players is of a different nature. Some other games indeed 
result in stronger incentives to cooperate and result in more stable outcomes: assurance (also 
called stag hunt) games or weakest-link games raise collective action issues but do not involve 
the same difficulties as the prisoners’ dilemma. It might be enough, in order to ensure that 
the cooperative equilibrium prevails, to build trust among players and to ensure a minimum 
degree of transparency7. 
Financial stability is a good example. All countries share an interest in it because the fall-
out from bank failures is first and foremost national. In an interconnected world, participants 
however need assurance that their partners share the same concern. It is a bit like fighting 
fires along a border between two properties: each of the two neighbours has a strong incen-
tive to contribute, and has no reason to be tempted to free-ride, unless one knows that her 
best efforts will be frustrated because the other does not care.    
Furthermore, the simple two-player, static model that is so useful for presentational pur-
poses should not be taken at face value when attempting to represent concrete international 
cooperation issues. For example, the underlying logic of the Paris agreement on climate change 
cannot be understood in a static setting. It only makes sense in a dynamic setting involving 
competition between a ‘dirty’ and a ‘clean’ technology (see Acemoglu et al, 2012). In such a 
model, the goal of an agreement is not to internalise the static externality arising from the emis-
sion of greenhouse gases – something that would require compulsion in one form or another 
– but to trigger a critical mass of initiatives that creates sufficient incentives for private players 
to invest in the development of the clean technology, so that it can eventually overtake the effi-
ciency of the dirty technology, or at least require much less subsidy than in a static setting. 
A valuable template for analysing international governance arrangements is provided 
by Elinor Ostrom’s work on the social arrangements through which human societies tackle 
local externalities. Ostrom’s (2009) major contribution was to show that, whereas economists 
regard market-driven interactions and state interventions as the only two alternatives, there 
are actually many possible social arrangements to manage local public goods. In her words, 
“the most important lesson for public policy analysis derived from [my] intellectual journey is 
that humans have a more complex motivational structure and more capability to solve social 
dilemmas than posited in earlier rational-choice theory” (Ostrom, 2009: 435). Accordingly, she 
7   This is an example of the dangers of relying on powerful but excessively simplified models that provide a compelling 
but often misleading image of the mechanisms at work and the policy challenges. 
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considered that there was a need “to ask how diverse polycentric institutions help or hinder 
the innovativeness, learning, adapting, trustworthiness, levels of cooperation of participants, 
and the achievement of more effective, equitable, and sustainable outcomes at multiple scales” 
(Ostrom, 2009: 436). 
A similar research agenda applies to global governance: there is a need to examine sys-
tematically – and critically – the variety of arrangements at work among nations or subna-
tional entities to find out what categories of problem they are dealing with, what the underly-
ing interactions are, which game structures are at play, who the relevant players are and, on 
this basis, how effective are the mechanisms they rely on. This examination should take into 
account (Figure 1): 
• The nature of interactions between players, the corresponding game structure and the 
resulting incentives to cooperate and deliver on commitments to cooperate;
• The number and diversity of players, in terms of size, influence and preferences;    
• The attributes on the basis of which players read and understand their mutual interaction, 
such as the role of epistemic communities in building a common knowledge base and over-
coming the obstacles to cooperation that arise from different representations of reality; 
• And, finally, the way institutions influence individual behaviour, either through enforcing 
common rules or by providing assessments and monitoring of individual behaviour.  
   Figure 1: Building blocks for the analysis of global governance issues
Source: Bruegel.
The analytical value of such a research agenda would be to help understand how and why 
different types of governance arrangements adequately address different types of collective 
action problems. More precisely, it should help map a limited set of governance templates 
onto a limited set of collective action games and a wider set of concrete international coop-
eration issues. Here again, Ostrom (2005) provided a telling analogy when she set herself the 
goal of digging “below the immense diversity of regularised social interaction [...] to iden-
tify universal building blocks used in crafting such structured interactions”. The diversity of 
regularised international interactions patterns is most likely to be less immense than that of 
interactions within societies, but the challenge is very similar.   
Institutions:
Membership, rules, decision-making, assessment, enforcement
Attributes
Beliefs, knowledge, commiment, trust
Players:
Nature
diversity of preferences
Interactions:
Nature of interdependence
game structure
time dimension
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3 Policy implications
The outright rejection by President Trump of most of the fundamental principles of multilat-
eralism, his decision to roll out an overly protectionist agenda, his choice to withdraw from 
the Paris agreement on climate change and his openly defiant attitudes towards international 
forums and institutions have triggered a major crisis in international economic relations. 
The rest of the world is witnessing with incredulity the destruction by its main creator of the 
post-second world war international order. 
Even before President Trump took office, however, this order was already crumbling. 
Disappointment and setbacks followed the mid-1990s high point of international coopera-
tion. In trade, investment, finance, the environment and a number of other fields, gridlocks, 
stalemates and rollbacks were observable. Geopolitical tensions, widespread second thoughts 
on globalisation, increasingly outdated features of international rules and institutions, the 
contradictory character of global governance and the sheer complexity of the problems the 
international community was confronted with, all contributed to this state of affairs. Already 
before Trump, the future of global governance was grim.
The tension between the pressing and often urgent need for global collective action 
and the increasing reluctance of sovereignty-conscious nations to cede competence, enter 
into binding agreements or abide by rules has rarely been so blatant. It is compounded by 
accumulated mutual mistrust, disputes over the governance of international institutions and 
growing rivalry between incumbents and emerging powers. Equally challenging is the com-
plexity of a web of interdependence that involves countries of highly unequal development 
levels, state and subnational authorities, as well as public and private players.  
Whoever sits in the White House, this tension will not vanish. It might even grow further. A 
lasting paralysis of the system of rules and institutions on the basis of which interdependence 
has been organised and managed for many decades is likely. Furthermore, there is a real risk 
of economic fragmentation and severe mismanagement of the global commons. 
The global community, or what remains of it, visibly hesitates over the choice of strategy. 
A first option is ‘conservationist’. It consists of preserving the existing order to the greatest 
extent possible. This was for example the approach followed by the remaining members of the 
Trans Pacific Partnership (TPP) after the US decided to withdraw in early 2017: they agreed in 
March 2018 to form a TPP-11 without the US. This has also been the attitude of the signatories 
of the 2015 Paris Agreement on climate change, again after the US withdrawal: they decided 
to go ahead anyway. 
The advantages of the ‘conservationist’ strategy are to contain the damage resulting from 
one country’s peculiar behaviour and to strengthen the other countries’ ownership of the 
multilateral system. It furthermore sets a precedent because if it can be successfully applied 
to the US, it has a chance of being effective with other countries. Its downside, however, is that 
it does not address the underlying problems. To the extent the US attitude is a symptom, the 
‘conservationist’ strategy does not tackle the disease. It is also unable to provide a solution 
to situations of potential stalemate in institutions where the US holds a blocking minority. It 
could in fact be defeated, at great cost to the international order. 
An alternative option is to try to turn the current crisis into an opportunity to redesign 
international arrangements. Such a strategy would have the advantage of learning the lessons 
from the exhaustion of traditional multilateral agreements and institutions, and of exper-
imenting afresh with new forms of cooperation for a different world. It would lead to the 
embrace of informality and flexibility, and whatever form of partial, variable-geometry and 
non-binding form of cooperation looks available. As indicated, there is already much experi-
ence from which to take lessons in this regard. 
The downside of this option, however, would be to overlook the intrinsic problems of 
international or global collective action and to believe too easily that flexibility and goodwill 
can tackle hard problems. What has been experienced so far is in fact flexibility on the margin 
through, for example, regional or sectoral trade agreements on the margin of the WTO frame-
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work, or regional financing arrangements on the margin of the IMF framework. To tilt the 
balance further towards flexibility would soon lead to an entirely different game, where the 
multilateral framework no longer provides the overarching architecture of cooperation.  
For the flexibility strategy to work and deliver results, it is not sufficient to embrace varia-
ble geometry or to minimise demands on state sovereignty. It is essential to design parsimoni-
ous arrangements that make the most of limited engagement on the part of the main nations 
and enlist non-state players to the greatest extent possible. The goal should be to find out how 
best to tackle economic, financial, environmental and technological interdependence in a 
world that is reluctant to relinquish political independence – and in which states are far from 
being all-powerful. 
A potentially more promising approach than either of these two strategies would be to 
define the minimal conditions that the multilateral framework must fulfil to provide a strong-
enough basis for flexible, variable-geometry and possibly informal arrangements. With such 
‘critical multilateralism’, a minimum set of universal principles and nimble global institutions 
would support collective action in a series of fields, each of which relying on specific, varia-
ble-geometry and incentive-compatible arrangements. 
Understood in this way, flexibility could provide an alternative to governance through a 
series of universal sectoral institutions. It should be seen as a way to promote collective action 
in a context of increased multipolarity, increased diversity and increased concerns over 
infringements of national sovereignty. The need for a new approach that makes room for flex-
ibility and cooperation between various institutions functioning as a network is increasingly 
recognised (Emininent Persons Group, 2018).
Such principles and institutions do exist. For example, the fundamental principles of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), such as national treatment and the most-fa-
voured nation clause, provide a basis for designing sector-specific or region-specific trade 
and investment arrangements. In the same way, the IMF is an example of a nimble institu-
tion whose scope and modus operandi have evolved considerably over time, despite largely 
unchanged articles of agreement. It has been able to support the G20 despite its informal 
character.    
The design of flexible arrangements would require for each particular topic a determina-
tion of the channels of interdependence, the incentives and disincentives to cooperation, and 
the critical mass of participants that would be sufficient to create a bandwagon effect. Again, 
the balance between formal obligations and non-mandatory objectives does not need to be 
the same across domains, because externalities and participation incentives differ.
In the end, we should neither cultivate the nostalgia of yesterday’s order nor invest our 
hopes in loose, ineffective forms of international cooperation. The narrow path ahead, if there 
is one, is to establish a sufficient, critical multilateral base for flexible arrangements and to 
equip policymakers with a precise toolkit for determining, on a field-by-field and topic-by-
topic basis, the minimum requirements of effective collective action. The precise definition of 
such an agenda requires intellectual, institutional and political investment. There is no time 
to lose.    
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